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Simon MERCIECA 
The Battle of Preveza 1538: 
the Knights of Malta's Perspective 
G !ACOMO BOSIO IS KNOWN PRIMARILY for his three-volume history of the Knights of St John with each volume runniug into over 700 pages and each page nearly the size of an A3 sheet. What is less known is that this history of the Knights contains a de-
tailed description of a number of historical events whose importance transcends the Order of 
Malta. The Battle ofPreveza of 1538 is a case in point. Bosio discusses this event in Volume 3 
of his Historia but, for unknown reasons, his description has never been given the attention that 
it deserves even though he gives a detailed account of what actually had happened in that battle. 
What I intend to do in this paper is to study Bosio's account and analyse whether his 
chronicle can furnish new and unedited information about this battle. It should be pointed out 
that Bosio began writing this work in the second half of the sixteenth century, some decades 
after the event even if he was not a contemporary since he was born in 1544 and died in 1627, 
but his account has the value of a primary source. 
Bosio's narrative consists of a detailed chronicle of what happened before and after the 
two opposing forces met at Preveza. At the same time, he went a step further and tried to give 
a care·ful personal interpretation of the different actions taken in the battle. He traced the major 
manoeuvres that took place at sea and sought to explain them in great detail, including a pro-
gressive account of all the military actions. The Order of St John had a direct interest to keep a 
detailed chronicle of the events since this could serve as a study on naval mauoeuvres for the 
Brethren. Bosio tried to challenge other contemporary writers whose works, in the meantime, 
appeared in print. As he himself goes on to explain, the merit of his account lies in the fact 
that it rests on first hand information which he obtained from people who had themselves par-
ticipated in that war and whom he met and interviewed on the subject. He did not neglect the 
written accounts by members of the Order who were themselves in battle but whose writings 
may now be lost. Among the works he consulted are the writings of Fra Giovan Antonio Fox-
ana, who was physically present at this sea battle. l 
Already, by the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Order of St John encouraged both 
knights and novices to undertake a number of sea voyages which began to be termed cara-
vane. The incentive behind this structure was that those who went on a caravan stood a better 
chance of obtaining a promotion within the Order. It became normal practice for Knights en-
gaged on caravans, to jot down notes concerning their experiences at sea which were then used 
1 See Bosro 1634, III, 179. 
-107-
r 
I 
I 
I 
SIMON MERCIECA 
as text manuals to learn about or improve their sea, operations and this is what have happened 
at Preveza; Foxana was amongst those Knights who recorded the movements of the fleet and 
the turnout of the battle? 
The owners of these manuscripts had already passed away when Bosio began writing his 
history but since the Knights were obliged to leave their books and manuscripts to the Order, 
this material ended up deposited at the Order's Chancellery.3 This is how these volumes came 
into Bosio's hands, after he took up the post of Chancellor! 
The Knights of St John arrived in Malta in 1530 and immediately began to focus all their en-
ergy and activity on building an innovative sea policy that at the time was non-existent on the 
Island. They settled in Birgu which was the only town in Malta situated on the coast. Their 
choice was determined by the fact that the Order of St John possessed a small fleet consisting of 
two big ships and three galleys. Galleys needed an operational base in a coastal inlet protected 
by some form offortifications.4 It was the presence of these galleys, which by the time of the Bat-
tle ofPreveza became four, that drew the Knights of St John into these international encounters. 
In the 1530s, the international climate in the Mediterranean was inclined to war.5 Bosio 
himself recoguizes this fact as he rightly pictures the Battle of Preveza within the euphoria of 
success which then dominated the Western Christian powers after their successful venture in 
Tunis. In Bosio's view, the formation of a powerful League came as a natural consequence. 
The mastermind behind this League or Holy Alliance was Pope Paul III who, no doubt, had as 
model the victorious expedition against Tunis by Emperor Charles V. Kenneth Setton viewed 
it as part of a bigger crusade that was organised by the West against the Levant6 but reading 
this war through Bosio' s narrative, it appears more an expedition aimed at helping Venice re-
gain part of her territory lost to the Ottoman Empire rather than an expedition directed for the 
recovery of Jerusalem. 
The political strategy adopted was one aimed at pleasing Venice, a powerful Christian 
state that had not participated in Charles V's formation against Tunisia. The Papacy chose 
Admiral Marco Grimani, Patriarch of the Venetian city of Aquileia as head of the Papal Fleet 
and the military strategy adopted was one that featured well in Venice's policy. For Venice, 
maritime routes were vital for her trade but the same could not be said for Spain and the Ot-
toman Empire. These last two depended mostly on land routes for their internal communica-
tion and trade within their Empire.7 But for Venice, Preveza was a well calculated choice: 
Bosio states that the League members agreed that if there was going to be any land conquered 
in the East this would pass to Venice.' Spain, Venice and the Papal States all parties to the 
League, had a direct interest to come together to face a common enemy. In 1537, the Ottoman 
Sultan, Suleiman I, tried to capture the Venetian Island of Corfu. Venice once again felt 
threatened by the Ottoman power whilst the loss of Corfu was seen by both Spain and the Pa-
pacy as the gateway for the invasion of Southern Italy.9 The last consideration was the defence 
of Tunis and its puppet regime of king Muley Assam. Spain and the Knights of Saint John 
2 See BOSIO 1634, III, 179. 
3 See MERCIECA 1992. 
4 See MERCIECA 2007. 
5 See HEERS 2003. 
6 See SETTON 1984, IV. 
7 See GUILMARTIN 1974, 20-21. 
8 See BOSIO 1634, III, 174. 
9 See GUILMARTIN 1974,45. 
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feared that Muley Assam was at the mercy of Barbarossa's fleet. All efforts were made to 
keep the fleet of Barbarossa engaged away from Tunis and prevent it from sailing to this coun-
try to remove king Muley Assam from power. 
In Bosio's terms attacking Preveza meant attacking the heart of the Ottoman's system. 
Moreover, the Christian world would begin to recover the area of Morea which was lost to the 
Ottomans in 1499. This was music for Venice's ears as the Morea was part of her former terri-
tory. Then, there was the perennial fear on the Western side derived from the continuous 
speculation that the Ottomans were planning the invasion of Italy or Sicily. By the 1530s, the 
Ottoman Empire began to be seriously considered to possess sufficient military resources to 
undertake such a mission since it had a large fleet and the western coast of Greece was consid-
ered to be its natural harbour from where to operate. 
The League based its success on the number of ships that it could bring together. Bosio 
differentiates between the ships that the Holy League believed it could raise from those that it 
really succeeded in bringing together. In theory the League projected an armada of 200 gal-
leysIO but in reaiity it had no more than 134 besides the auxiliary support ships. II Having made 
these calculations, Bosio noted that the Ottoman navy under Khaireddin Barbarossa was by far 
superior in number and far better armed than the one under the command of the Genoese Ad-
miral Andrea Doria. 12 
The Papacy promised to bring together an army of 40 galleys, four of which belonged to 
the Order of Malta. Portugal was expected to contribute to this squadron, the Emperor had to 
bring 82 galleys and Venice the same number. Incidentally, Venice promised the Papacy wood 
from her forests to enable the Church to build 32 galleys. In return, Venice was allowed to 
import grain from Sicily without having to pay any taxes thereon. 13 
In July 1538, the Viceroy of Sicily, Don Ferrando Gonzaga, acting under instructions from 
the Pope and the Emperor -but not Venice- joined the Christian Armada. He pledged to sup-
ply the galleys with all that was needed in terms of victuals and armaments. The reason for 
Venice's absenteeism can be easily understood. Whilst the Genoese Andrea Doria was given 
absolute command over the armada, the League discussed whether the coordination of the ter-
restrial operations should be assigned to the Viceroy of Sicily, Ferrando Gonzaga or to the 
Duke of Urbino. I ' Eventually, the Viceroy of Sicily, Ferrando Gonzaga had the upper hand, a 
position that he would always seek to uphold each time that, during the battle, he discussed 
terrestrial operations. He insisted to have them under his command. This was not music to 
Venice's ear. It had a direct interest to assume full control of all land operations, in particular 
as the target was a territory situated at the edge of her Adriatic Empire. 
According to Guilmartin, Andrea Doria was brought into this battle thanks to the Spanish 
crown, which had the habit of hiring galleys from private owners. IS Was the participation of the 
Order's squadron in this battle part of this Spanish system? Bosio gives us no information as to 
any reward, in terms of money, offered to the Order of St John to participate in this naval alliance. 
While the Armada's mission was eastward bound, the gathering of all the forces had to be 
carried out in stages and was determined by the geographical location of the participants. 
10 See BOSIO 1634, III, 173. 
II See BosIO 1634, III, 178. 
12 See BOSIO 1634, III, 179. 
13 See BOSIO 1634, III, 173. 
14 See BosIO 1634, III, 173. 
15 See GUILMARTIN 1974, 32-33. 
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Since the Papal States, Genoa and Spain were on the Tyrranean Sea their meeting point was to 
be the city of Messina which had the largest harbour in Sicily and faced eastwards. 
Also in July, through the Viceroy of Sicily, Gonzaga, Pope Paul III requested the Order to 
be part of the League. Bosio recounts that they were furnished with all that was necessary.I6 
The Knights formed a caravan assigning 45 knights to each galley besides the rest of the crew. 
In all, a contingent of 180 knights, besides the regular soldiers, joined the League. Their pres-
ence was advantageous to the Christian army. They formed a sort of an elite corps. They were 
professionally trained soldiers, capable of successfully undertaking amphibious attacks. This 
contingent was put under the command of Captain Fra. Paolo Simeone. I7 
The gathering of the fleet took time and this was one of the biggest disadvantages of the 
whole operation. Geographical distance played to the Knights' advantage as the Maltese vessels 
were the first to reach the city of Messina followed by the squadron of Andrea Doria. They were 
joined by the squadron of the Papacy and that of the Viceroy of Sicily: The Viceroy himself de-
cided to participate in person on his flagship, the Capitana of Sicily. It was only by the end of 
August 1538 that the fleet, consisting of 66 ships, succeeded to come together in formation thus 
permitting it to move out and sail in full force towards the Venetian enclave of Corfu." 
Near Corfu, the squadron was joined by two more galleys of the Pope as well as the Ve-
netian contingent. The entire armada proceeded to the harbour of Gominizze where it rested 
for 22 days awaiting more ships and preparing for battle. All in all, the armada totalled 135 gal-
leys and 62 ships including two galleons, one was Doria's and the other belonged to Venice. 
One of the criticisms levelled at Doria was about the length of time he had taken to gather 
the fleet. He was accused of procrastinating and Stanley Lane-Poole even went as far as to af-
firm that «Doria was certainly not the man he once was; politics had spoilt him».19 However, 
if one reads the maritime history of sixteenth-century Mediterranean Sea battles, one finds that 
there were serious considerations which contributed to delay the formation of the fleet. Such big 
fleets consumed an enormous amount of victuals and organizing provisions took time. Bosio 
recounts that the Hospitaller galleys took as provisions fresh bread, large quantities of vegeta-
bles and consumed an ox per day per galley?O In Doria's case, the fleet had started gathering in 
April and carried on up to late September. Communications were slow and Doria had to take 
into consideration the fact that the Turks' sailing season extended to the end of December?I All 
these factors put together determined that the sea battle had to be waged late in the season. 
As was to be expected from such a high profile mission, meritocracy was an important 
component. The formation of the fleet was not only governed by military exigencies as invisi-
ble ranks existed within the Armada which determined the positioning of the galleys. Despite 
this handicap, Bosio insists that it was the biggest Christian armada to have set sail in this part 
of the Mediterranean since the time of the fall of the Roman Empire.22 No doubt, Bosio was 
referring to the Battle of Actium between Marc Antony and Octavian. 
Bosio's comparison with the Battle of Actium can provide another possibility for the delay 
that, until now, seems to have escaped all scholars who have studied the Battle of Preveza. If 
16 See BOSIO 1634, III, 177. 
17 See BOSIO 1634, III. 177. 
18 See BOSIO 1634, III, 177. 
19 See LANE-POOLE 1890, 102. 
20 See BOSIO 1634, III, 175. 
21 See FOURNIER 1667, Paris. 
22 See BoSIO 1634, III, 178. 
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one studies the logistics of the Battle of Actium one will find that the two opponents met to-
wards the end of September. Taking the context of the period Bosio was writing, it follows 
that the classical period was playing a role. Sixteenth century Italy was still under the spell of 
the Renaissance and one suspects that Doria had a good knowledge of history and wanted to 
emulate Octavian's victory. What the participants of this expedition where perhaps less con-
scious of was the fact that Preveza was to be the first important sea battle of the modem era. 
As has already, been argued, the arrival of the armada at Preveza does not seem to have 
been an accident of History. However, the element of fortune did play its role. Some chroni-
clers were led to think that it was by mere chance that the whole armada ended up in front of 
Preveza since before launching the land attack, Doria went out to seek the Turkish Armada 
and found it at Preveza. On their part, the Turkish army too was following Doria's movements 
and anticipated his arrival at Preveza with the result that part of Ottoman vessels reached the 
harbour of Preveza before the arrival of the Christian fleet.23 The castle at the mouth of the 
Gulf of Arta also succeeded in receiving support and aid from the Turks at Lepanto. 
Once at Preveza, the Christian army decided to attack the castle which being situated at the 
mouth of the Gulf of Arta prevented the fleet from entering the gulf. The first attack came 
from the Papal fleet but it was repelled. The second attack was mounted by the Venetians 
whose Admiral, Vincenzo Cappello, began to disembark his soldiers to besiege the fort. 
Simultaneously, Barbarossa applied a decoying tactic and, with the remainder of the fleet, 
went to Corfu in anticipation of the Christian fleet's reaction. He was not wrong. The Chris-
tian fleet's reaction was soon felt as Doria moved part of his flotilla to bring aid to the Ve-
netian Island of Corfu. However, Barbarosa's attack on Corfu cost him the life of 1000 of his 
men. Faced with such a defeat, while the situation at Preveza continued to become tense, Bar-
barosa abandoned the siege and moved out to help the besieged castle. Lack of coordination 
from the Christian side, as well as the fact that part of the army had been dispatched in support 
of Corfu, Barbarossa's fleet made it once more into the Bay ofPreveza without encountering 
any resistance from the Christian army.24 
By the time Barbarossa arrived, the Christian army had already called off the siege against 
the castle of Arta and all the soldiers returned to their posting on the galleys. Bosio recounts in 
detail the stalemate that ensued. Barbarossa's fleet was trapped in the Gulf while the Christian 
navy had weighed anchor outside and therefore Barbarossa could not be attacked. At this 
point, a discussion arose among the Christian generals who wished to take advantage of the 
shallow entrance of the gulf and wreck two ships at its entrance, by filling them with stones 
and debris The chamIel was so narrow that this would have blockaded the Ottoman fleet inside 
but at the same tinIe would have prevented the Christian army from moving in or attempting any 
amphibious attack on Preveza. Viceroy Gonzaga offered to take the land command and disem-
bark the troop to lay siege to the castle. After weighing the pros and cons of such actions, the 
commanders of the Christian League decided to abandon this option?' 
Meanwhile Doria feared that since it was already the end of September, his army would 
have been blocked in Preveza something he had no intention or desire to do and thus disagreed 
with the Viceroy of Sicily, Ferrante Gonzaga, to wage a fully fledged war. Instead, he sug-
gested that the Christian Armada should move out, attack and liberate Lepanto and Patrasso. 
23 See BOSIO 1634, III, 181. 
24 See Bosro 1634, III, 178. 
25 See BOSIO 1634, III, 178. 
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This would mean the beginning of the «liberation» of the Morea. Moreover, it was.argued that 
this area offered better harbour facilities for the ships than Preveza. However this strategy had 
one big drawback; the Christian fleet would have had to sail and pass in front of Barbarossa's 
fleet and this would certainly provoke a battle giving Barbarossa a valid reason to go to war 
and help him recover his reputation which he had lost after Tunis. 
According to Bosio, in view of an i=inent battle, Doria wanted to strengthen the Ve-
netian navy by posting soldiers, who until then had been on the supply vessels, on the Ve-
netian galleys. The reasons for these were two. First, Venice's galleys were not well equipped 
for war. Secondly, in case of a naval engagement, Doria would ensure that Cappello would 
remain in battle and not try to escape. But Cappello, strongly objected. He insisted that he had 
sufficient soldiers and should the need arise, he would recall his soldiers from the Venetian 
land fortress to reinforce his galleys. Furthermore, Cappello insisted that he could not allow 
Spanish soldiers on board his ships unless he first got clearance from the Senate. 
One can clearly understand Venice's objection but this showed lack of unity among the 
League members. Bosio believed that this refusal undermined the general co=and of Andrea 
Doria.26 No doubt Bosio was correct in his analysis. Such a Venetian stance brought on an 
overall feeling of dissatisfaction among the soldiers. 
The formation of an armada of ships from different nations had another disadvantage. 
Each nation sought to keep its particular squadron together rather than acting in unison. When 
Doria came to lead his squadron into battle formation, he had to take into consideration all 
these factors. Andrea Doria's ship was stationed in the middle of the arinada while he en-
trusted his nephew, Gian Andrea Doria with four fast galleys to serve as a connecting link be-
tween the front and rear of the armada. Bosio laments that this enabled Barbarossa to under-
stand Doria's strategy for any ensuing battle. " 
By nightfall, the Christian army passed by the entrance to the Gulf of Acta. It was in such 
order, insists Bosio, that Barbarossa could count each and every vessel of the Christian ar-
mada. The Christians dropped anchor in front of the Gulf to blockade its entrance. The follow-
ing morning, six Turkish galleys moved out of the harbour with their main masts dismantled, 
apparently sailing towards the direction of the island of Santa Maura. Soon six Christian gal-
leys under Gian Andrea Doria's co=and went out in hot pursuit blocking them and after en-
gaging them in an exchange of cannon fire forced the Turks to retreat to the harbour.27 
I=ediately Barbarossa ordered another six galleys to move out of the harbour. This time 
it was the tum of the Knight Hospitaller's galleys, under Paolo Simeone, to give chase. His 
squadron was made up of four galleys and another two from the Papacy. Again, the Turks re-
peated the same tactics. This time, Simeone wanted to cut their way so that they could not re-
enter the Gulf but seeing the Christian galleys advancing, they retreated quickly back into the 
harbour but Simeone opened fire, causing great damage to the retreating galleys. Barbarossa 
ordered another four galleys to go out but this time it was the tum of the Papal squadron under 
Grimani to give chase and drive them back. 
Some thought that Barbarossa was adopting these tactics so as to keep the Christian forces 
anchored outside this bay exposed to all elements. Others considered this move by Barbarossa 
a practical teaching lesson for his captains so that they could learn more about the tactics and 
the power of the guns of the Christian galleys. Following these skirmishes, the Christian 
26 ~ee BOSIO 1634, III, 178. 
27 See BOSIO 1634, III, 179. 
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commanders concluded that Barbarossa did not want a fight. Hence Doria ordered his men to 
lift anchor and proceed towards Lepanto at the force of sails. But the wind's direction changed 
to southeast forcing his ships to rely on oars. Thus the armada moved slowly toward Capo 
Ducato (known as Porto Suessola) on the Island of Santa Maura .arriving the following day, 27 
September 1538, the feast of st. Cosmas and St. Damian2'. Barb'arossa i=ediately moved his 
army out of the harbour in pursuit of the Christians. Soon, fast moving frigates entrusted by 
the Christian army with a reconnaissance mission returned back to inform the fleet about Bar-
barossa's manoeuvres.29 
Barbarossa's move came as a surprise to the Christians who had thought that he had no in-
tention of moving his army out the harbour. According to Bosio, it was Munuc Aga «Council-
lor» and manservant of the Sultan who convinced Barbarossa to undertake such a risky move. 
Bosio continues stating that Aga threatened Barbarossa with the wrath of the Sultan unless he 
did not go out and fight. 30 
The first to spot the arrival of the Ottoman armada were two of the Venetian galleons 
which had lagged behind due to the weariness of the crew. A battle was now inevitable. Bosio 
goes on to discuss the battle formation basing his information on the unedited writings about 
the battle kept by the Knights. He informs his readers that Barbarossa adopted the form of a 
spread-eagle formation. At its head Barbarossa put Dragut's twenty galleys and ten galleots 
with Barbarossa's Capitana in the middle, bedecked with flags including a large red banner. 
The left flank was under Tabach (sic) Reis and the right under Salec (sic) Rais. The rear was 
made up of the auxiliary ships consisting of galleots, fuste imd brigantines.31 
But of particular interest was the size of the fleet that according to Bosio was far superior 
in number to that of Prince Doria's. Barbarossa had many more galleys, amounting to over 
160 besides the fuste and the brigantines, while Doria's did not add up to more than 134 galleys. 
Bosio assures us that the count was made by the Knights themselves present at this battle. They 
had counted the enemy galleys and more than once to make sure of their number. Furthermore 
Doria's galleys were not considered to be as well equipped as Barbarossa's.32 Besides Bar-
barossa had the added advantage that his army had rested the night at a home base, giving his 
crew the time to recoup while fresh victuals were taken aboard. He also reinforced his crew and 
had the advantage that his armada was already at its fighting stations whilst Doria's was not. 
Doria fired a cannon shot, as a signal to rally all his ships to come closer together to take 
up battle formation. 33 This formation was a rather defensive one intended to counter attack. 
Bosio explained that the entire armada was separated into four groups, and each group con-
sisted in a line of galleys. At the head Doria placed six galleys, four belonged to the Order of 
St John and another two belonged to the Emperor. These were put under the co=and of 
Simeone. Next he positioned three squadrons of galleys followed i=ediately by his own gal-
leys. Next came another 43 galleys placed in line formation after which, at a distance of about 
a quarter of mile behind them, came the remaining galleys of the Papacy and Venice. At the 
rear were placed the supply vessels of fuste and brigantines. 
28 See BOSIO 1634, III, 179. 
29 See BOSIO 1634, III, 179. 
30 See BOS10 1634, III, 179. 
31 See BOSIO 1634, III, 179. 
32 See BOS10 1634, III, 179. 
33 See Bosro 1634, III, 179. 
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This rectangular fonnation allowed the fleet to attack and encircle enemy squadrons on both 
sides but it had the disadvantage that many of its galleys would have to remain out of the fray as 
the actual battle would be fought by those in the front line while the middle would be hindered 
from advancing because of the confusion that nonnally ensued on the front line of battle. 
In retrospect, Doria decided to go on the defensive and counter attack. Taking advantage 
of Venice's galleon, which was the swiftest, he ordered it to break ranks and move forward 
followed by the other galleys and attack the flank under Salec's co=and. By this manoeuvre, 
Doria hoped to destroy some of Barbarossa's galleys.34 Meanwhile, repeating the same ma-
noeuvre, Doria focused his forces and attacked the other flank under Tabech. At the agreed 
moment, trumpets were sounded and flags flown and the entire fleet moved forward to attack 
in this fonnation. The cannon fire did not impede the Venetian galleon from advancing, forc-
ing some of Salec's galleys into retreat.35 
Doria took advantage of the wind that had changed direction allowing his fleet to sail with 
the wind. However at the precise moment of attacking there was a change in wind again. The 
winds calmed down and those ships including the galleons that depended entirely on their sails 
got stuck in the centre for at least half an hour - time enough for the ·fortunes of battle to 
change. Bosio goes on to tell us that if there had not been a change of wind, Doria would have 
ra=ed and annihilated the enemy.36 
With the wind once again against him, Doria could only move his army of galleys into bat-
tle without the support of the big ships and he refused to take this risk. If he had continued to 
move on he would have detached himself from part of his anny and by the evening his crew 
would have been too tired to face battle. Inexperience did the rest. According to Bosio part of 
Doria's army was inexpert in maritime affairs -though perhaps too enthusiastic about the war-
yet still wanting to continue moving forward to face Barbarossa.37 
On his part, Barbarossa seems to have been playing a waiting game procrastinating until 
the afternoon or evening when the right moment cropped up. The change in the wind played to 
his advantage for he ended up sailing with it in his favour,38 with the knowledge that he would 
rely on a rested crew. 
The delaying tactics psychologically unnerved the Christian army. Doria began to face "the 
pressure from his generals who were requesting and insisting to attack while levelling accusa-
tions against him that he was now too old and that was the cause for his lack of the necessary 
stamina to face the enemy.39 
In particular, Bosio accredits the Venetian General Cappello with a Spartan spirit. Accord-
ing to the Knights who had participated in this war, Cappello literally went to see Doria, 
dressed in full annour, arriving at Doria's flagship in a fully decorated frigate. During the 
meeting, Cappello blatantly told Doria that if he did not feel up to attacking Barbarossa, he, 
Cappello, was more than willing to take action and, if need be, even takeover the avant-garde 
position which was the riskier. Doria politely declined and sent him back to his post.40 The 
Patriarch Grimani, who like Cappello went personally to Doria, expressed the same proposal. 
34 See BOSIO 1634, III, 179. 
35 See BOSIO 1634, III, 180. 
36 See BOSIO 1634, III, 180. 
37 See BOSIO 1634, III, 180. 
38 See BOSIO 1634, III, 180. 
39 See BOSIO 1634, III, 180. 
40 See BOSIO 1634, III, 180. 
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Meanwhile, the two armies continued to slowly approach each other to the extent that the 
colours of the Turkish galleys became clearly visible from the Order's position which was at 
the head of the Christian squadron. They could even discern the colours of the vests worn by 
the Turkish soldiers in Dragnt's squadron:l 
Doria was tying his fortune to the climate and continued to wait for a change of wind. 
Hopes began to rise when clouds were seen coming from southwest but the desired breeze 
failed to materialize. Therefore Doria had to change his war strategy. He sent a message to 
Simeone to pull up oars and wait for the arrival of his squadron without firing a shot so that 
the whole front squadron would join up with the second line of squadrons.42 
Furthermore, he ordered all other galleys to take up their original positions. Written or-
ders, with drawings, indicating their position were immediately sent out to all captains while 
instructing them to be on the look out for fresh orders that would follow in due course. In this 
new formation, the Prince's galleon stood in the centre. On his right flank he had the Hospi-
taller galleys. Doria wanted the rest of the squadron to move ahead to form a line position.43 
However, despite the command given, both Cappello and the Patriarch did not realize in 
time that their galleys were meant to move up to the front line position. Bosio attributes this to 
the lack of attention of their look-outs in interpreting the flag signals that were being sent from 
the flagship. Instead of taking a line position, the galleys of Venice and the Papacy moved for-
ward and nearly collided with the avant-garde ships causing great confusion and imperilling 
the Christian galleys. 
According to Bosio, Barbarossa was in doubt as to whether this was a mistake or a new 
tactical move of Doria's. As the day was now nearly over, Barbarossa chose to maintain his 
position of observation and moved his fleet closer to the shores of the Island of Santa Maura 
but without giving time to the Christian galleys to disentangle themselves from the confusion 
and regain an orderly formation.44 
Barbarossa positioned his galleys with their stern towards land and their bows facing the 
Christian Armada while keeping under surveillance the movements of the enemy and his can-
nons aimed at the Christian army.45 Doria, meanwhile, with great difficulty, tried to bring back 
into line the galleys and reassemble his fleet but his men were dispirited by this debacle and 
the galleys ended up literally having to be towed into position. 
This gave Barbarossa the opportunity to align his ships in a firing position, moving closer 
to the Christian ships and opening his cannons from the bows onto the side of the galleys. 
Bosio recounts that a big cloud of smoke and fire followed: it was «hell». The Christian army 
sustained great damage, in particular, those galleys that did not have the protection of the aux-
iliary ships to act as buffers. Furthermore the Admiral's flagship failed to give orders to 
counter attack with the result that the galleys did not enter into action:6 
At sunset the enemy stopped firing on the Christian vessels but found that some of the 
Turkish galleys were giving assault to the Venetian Galleon while Salec was overtaking and 
attacking two Venetian galleys which, according to Bosio, were poorly armed and were slow 
41 See BOS1O 1634, III, 180. 
42 See BOSI0 1634, III, 180. 
4' See BOSI0 1634, III, 180. 
44 See BOS1O 1634, III, 180. 
45 See BOSI0 1634, III, 180. 
46 See BOSI0 1634, III, 181. 
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in their manoenvres. They were overrun after a fierce fight.·7 
Doria, on the other hand, went around his galleys trying to attract the enemy's attention so 
as to act as a decoy and force Barbarossa to pursue him. At the same time, Doria forbade the 
Christian galleys from opening fire but wanted them to wait until the enemy entered into battle 
before counter attacking in unison with all the artillery. In this Doria was right. Cannons at 
that time were not so accurate and they caused less damage than one might be led to believe 
today. It was a time when the artillery was not yet precise in hitting its target. In fact it was 
very often quite approximate. Therefore actually succeeding in hitting a target was cause for 
cheering amongst the seafarers.'s This was countered by seeking to have the best manoeuvra-
bility. Rapidity in movement aided the galley to avoid being hit by enemy missiles" not for-
getting that galleys carried their ensign and were easily identified by both friend and foe. 
In battle, the galleys of the Order were those immediately identified and attacked because, 
according to Bosio, they were the most hated. 50 Preveza was no exception. One of the galleys 
of the Order of St John under the command of del Gallo was hit by four cannon balls. One hit 
the prow and killed Fra Alvaro Fernandez d' Almeida and Fra Diego d'Ulloa together with 
other members of the crew." Another killed Gaspare Sommaripa, the boatswain of the galley 
Caterinetta. Moreover, hit by an underwater shot, Captain Figara's Hospitaller galley began to 
take in water and the crew had to surrender while others sought refuge on nearby ships. 
As night approached it began to rain and this forced the harquebusiers of the Ottoman 
army to seek cover so that the gunpowder would not get wet. The cannons too went out of ac-
tion. Doria capitalized on this situation to save the fleet. Moreover, two ships belonging to 
Captains Boccanegra and Machin respectively, which were so weak that they were deemed 
lost, fell victim to the corsairs' frontal attack. They served as a distraction and gave Doria the 
opportunity to keep the enemy engaged thus giving his army a better chance to escape. 
Eventually, even Boccanegra's and Machin's ship succeeded in escaping to safety after 
losing many of his Spanish soldiers. Machin's ship remained under enemy attack for much 
longer. It lost the main mast whilst part of the sails were burnt. Despite these drawbacks, the 
crew continued to fight courageously and in the end the Ottomans let her go. These two gal-
leys together with the Venetian galleon, which also was extensively damaged, reached the rest 
of the Armada.52 
Bosio goes into the detail of the manoeuvres adopted by Doria to move out of the battle. 
He recounted how Doria put up the foresail and slowly set sail for Corfu so as not to abandon 
the other ships giving them the chance to follow his trail. But then Doria changed tactics and 
put up his full sails and moved forward as fast as possible while keeping the lights of the three 
back lanterns off. These three lanterns were synonymous of a flagship in both Christian and 
Muslim fleets. They were only to be found on the Admiral's ship. Putting the lights out was 
interpreted as a move to impede the enemy from following Doria's manoeuvres. And accord-
ing to Bosio this aided the fleet to escape in the darkness of the night and reach the Gulf of 
Arta.53 Other historians however interpreted this as an act of cowardice. 
'7 See BOSIO 1634, Ill, 181. 
48 See BOSIO 1634, Ill, 148. 
49 See BOSIO 1634, Ill, 147. 
50 See BOSIO 1634, Ill, 148. 
51 See BOSIO 1634, Ill, 181. 
52 See BOSIO 1634, Ill, 181. 
53 See BOSIO 1634, Ill, 181. 
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Doria did succeed in saving the fleet but not his reputation. Bosio concurs that at the end 
of the day, Doria had lost most of his great reputation.54 As can be expected from such situa-
tions, the morale of the Ottoman navy was at its highest. Barbarossa had regained his lost 
prestige in the eyes of the West. The same could not be said for the Christian side. 
Internal strife followed with each side accusing the other for the defeat. Prince Doria ac-
cused Cappello and the Venetian for the defeat because of their refusal to take Spanish sol-
diers on board their galleys. Doria even accused the Venetians of something else. He accused 
them of having kept their sails furled and tied solely with reeds and hoisted in such manner 
that with a simple tug they would be in full sail and could flee, abandoning the Imperial Ar-
mada to the enemy and manifestly endangering the Realms of Naples and Sicily. 55 
On their part, the Venetians replied that they had reinforced their galleys with good Ve-
netian soldiers. Furthermore they admitted that they had tied the sails with reeds and this was 
done with foresight in order to be able to put the enemy to flight had they realized that the Ot-
toman armada was going to ram them. On his part, Bosio insists that Doria should never have 
doubted the Venetians but should have conceded them the avant-garde position in battle as 
they had requested.56 
On the other hand, Barbarossa after having forced the Christian armada to retreat moved to 
the Gulf of Acta and from there sailed towards the Island of Paxu some 12 miles from the 
Cape of Corfu. Bosio interpreted this as Barbarossa' s move to again challenge the Christian 
armada to fight. However, Barbarossa must have taken into account the fact that with so many 
captains it was going to be very difficult to get the Christian army to unite and take up the 
challenge.57 Gonzaga, Viceroy of Sicily, wanted to take up the challenge and said so to the rest 
of the leaders of the Christian Armada. His suggestion was approved and, as a sign of good 
will, now Venice accepted to take on 25 Spanish soldiers on each one of her galleys in prepa-
ration for battle. On 7 October, the Christian army moved against the island of Paxu but once 
there found that Barbarossa's army had meanwhile moved back to the Gulf of Acta. 
The overall feeling in the army was not to return home without even attempting to raid the 
Turkish enclaves. At first, it was suggested to attack Durazzo. But the Venetian General ob-
jected saying that in the area there was no secure harbour capable of taking all the Christian 
fleet. Instead it was agreed that the Christian armada should move against Castelnuovo in the 
Gulf of Cattaro that was in the hands of the Turks. It had two castles, one down by the harbour 
and another on the highest hill. The Christian army was now proceeding with great advantage. 
Bad weather prevented Barbarossa from stopping the Christian fleet from landing its troops at 
Castelnuovo. 
The four galleys of the Order remained at sea to watch out for the return of the Turkish 
armada while the rest of the army attacked Castelnuovo. Two other galleys had been left at 
Corfu for the same reason. Bosio says that Castelnuovo was an easy prey and was quickly 
conquered. As for Gonzaga, Bosio writes that he showed his knowledge as supreme com-
mander of territorial operations. More than 2000 inhabitants were made prisoners. 
On learning the news of the capture of Castelnuovo, Barbarossa moved his army to go and 
assist this Turkish possession. However winter was now approaching and navigation in Octo-
ber was not always at its best. Barbarossa fell victim of the weather and in the process of 
54 See Bosra 1634, III, 181. 
55 See BOSIO 1634, III, 181. 
"See Basra 1634, III, 181-182. 
57 See Basra 1634, III, 182. 
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reaching Castelnuovo lost, according to Bosio, thirty vessels between galleys and galleots, 
which ran aground on the reefs of Cimera and the island of Suasino.58 
On seeing Barbarossa's armada approaching, the galleys of the Knights and the two other 
galleys left behind in Corfu set out to join the rest of the Christian armada. They arrived rather 
quickly because the wind was in their favour. Since Barbarossa had lost some of his ships, the 
Christian army wanted to capitalize on the situation by giving chase and forcing him into battle.59 
At the same time, some of the generals feared the winter that was fast approaching and 
therefore agreed to retreat but left behind a squadron of soldiers to keep control of Castel-
nuovo. Doria opted to leave an army of 4000 Spanish soldiers under Francesco Sarmiento. The 
Spanish soldiers objected, maintaining that they were going to be left as prey of the Turkish 
enemy. Cappello objected too, mentioning the fact that any territory that would have been 
conquered should have gone to Venice. Therefore he wanted the Venetian soldiers to occupy 
the fortress. Venice in tum expressed fear that such a large force could easily be diverted by 
Spain against her. Eventually, Venice resolved the problem by seeking a unilateral truce with 
the Ottoman Empire. She obtained it through the intervention of Ambassador Lorenzo Gritti. 60 
Doria proceeded with the rest of the Imperial Army towards Brindisi. The Viceroy of Sic-
ily Gonzaga proceeded to Messina where he arrived towards the middle of December only to 
find that a large number of the Spanish soldiers stationed at Castelnuovo had abandoned their 
position and sailed to Messina without being authorized. The soldiers explained that they had 
taken the decision because they had not been paid for the past four months and therefore they 
no longer felt bound to obey his orders to remain at Castelnuovo. In all, there were about 6000 
soldiers demanding payment. Promising them payment, Doria ordered their galleys to move to 
the Island of Lipari. However, the soldiers refused to obey orders and stayed on to the point 
where extreme measures had to be taken and the Royal Gate (Porta Reale) of Messina was 
hastily closed to prevent them entering the city. Gonzaga reacted by ordering his galleys to 
moor with their bows pointing towards the city and fired his cannons onto the motley gathered 
there. But this had the negative effect of forcing the soldiers to flee to the nearby hills out of 
range of the. cannons where they began to sack the nearby villages. 
The soldiers resorted to banditry:' attacking peasants and villages in Sicily; Randazzo, 
Monforte, S. Lucia, Roccella, Francavilla and Linguagrossa were all targets. Other land on the 
edge of the Etna fell under the sickle. It was open warfare, Bosio states. The services of the 
Barons of Sicily were required to calm the situation but even that was not enough. Eventually 
the soldiers were promised that any excesses co=itted would be pardoned and at the same 
time were given four month salary to calm them down. The soldiers fell for it and once they 
laid down their arms, the authorities did not keep their word. Some of the soldiers were killed 
on the spot, others, fortunate enough to escape, were hunted down. Escaping from Sicily was 
not enough to gain i=unity for the hunt extended to Saragosa. Bosio carries on saying that 
one could see the bodies of the dead Spanish soldiers lying everywhere. The Council of Spain 
made a formal protest however the Emperor eventually pardoned the Viceroy.62 
But even Barbarossa did not fare well in this battle. Bosio went a step further and confirms 
58 See BOSIO 1634, III, 182. Guilmartin gives a higher figure. He state~ that the Ottoman fleet was subsequently 
decimated by a sudden storm and suffered a loss of70 galleys and ga1iots. See GUILMARTIN 1974, 55. 
59 See BoSIO 1634, III, 182. 
60 See BoSIO, 1634, III, 182. 
61 See BOSIO 1634, III, 183. 
62 See BOSIO 1634, III, 183. 
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that in reality the Turkish armada lost more vessels than the Christian side. In fact, the Turkish 
armada lost thirty vessels, between galleys and galleots, against the reefs of Cimera and the 
Island of Suasino.63 
One can only but agree with Guilmartin that Preveza was «probably the greatest Ottoman 
fleet victory of the sixteenth century».64 However, Bosio's views are different and he is right 
to depict it as a pyrrhic victory. Yet, such a consideration should not obfuscate this Ottoman 
achievement in the west. What diminished its importance at the time were the numerous 
apologetic writings, which began to circulate i=ediately after the defeat that tried to tone 
down the Turkish victory. To a certain extent, Bosio was one of them. It was of paramount 
interest to the Christian west that their subjects did not lose heart at a time when the archen-
emy was beginning to appear invincible. However, these writings contained one proviso; they 
sought a scapegoat to account for the Christian debacle. On the contrary, Bosio sought to give 
an analytical perspective based on maritime considerations. 
What Admiral Doria and the Emperor failed to take into consideration at the time was the 
power of the press. This new medium would be used to propagate ideas and to criticise or 
praise the actions of men in power. For Doria and the Emperor, pamphlets were frivolous. 
What was important was that, at the end of the day, Doria and his allies had succeeded in 
safeguarding their private galleys, whilst the Emperor continued to have at his disposal a big 
fleet to defend his southern coastal territory. The mission to Preveza had failed to materialise 
but had succeeded at Castelnuovo thus qualifying the overall mission a success. However for 
those involved in maritime strategy, including the Knights of St John, this was a lost sea battle 
but one from which they had learned much. The manner in which Barbarossa laid out his 
squadrons had taught the Christian side a lesson. As Bosio himself recounts, notes were kept 
of Barbarossa's manoeuvres and his tactics would be used once again: this time against the 
Ottoman army at Lepanto. The Christian formation would take the format of an eagle (before 
charging into battle) as amply manifested in a painting of the period which was co=issioned 
by a member of the Order.65 
It is not the intention of this paper to argue whether Bosio's narrative is correct or other-
wise. I leave that to other historians. What I have tried to do is to present his narrative and the 
Order of St John's perception of this battle since, on reading Bosio's work, one finds that his 
version varies in some details from other historical narratives of the same event. 66 Guilmartin 
admits that the tale of this battle is surrounded by confusion and its historical narrative poses 
many questions with the result that its international importance has been underestimated. Even 
the sequence of events has not been adequately explained.67 Such confusion is not. only the 
result of different historical versions of what happened in that distant autumn of 1538 but also 
that, for the first time, historians were confronted with an event of international maguitude. I 
hope that Bosio's narrative has helped to give us a better insight as to what happened at 
Preveza in the autumn of 1538. 
63 See BoslO 1634, III, 182. 
64 GUILMARTIN 1974, 22. 
6S See ESPINOSA-RoDRIGUEZ 2007, 37. 
66 Amongst these is Stanley Lane-Poole whose work entitled The Barbary Corsairs, (and already quoted in this 
text) and was published in'1890 the series The Story a/the Nations. More recently John Francis Guilmartin Jr. 
published his work entitled Gunpowder and Galleys in the series Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History. 
This work was also extensively used in this paper. 
67 GUlLMAR'rIN 1974,42. 
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